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We estimate the direct partial wage effect for native workers of an immigrant-induced 
increase in labor supply, using longitudinal records drawn from Norwegian registers and the 
national skill cell approach of Borjas (2003). Our results show overall negative wage impacts 
for both men and women. Focusing on differential wage impacts by immigrant origin, we 
find that immigrant inflows from the neighboring Nordic countries have more negative wage 
effects than inflows from developing countries. The pattern is consistent with factor demand 
theory if natives and other Nordic citizens are close substitutes. We also find that impact 
estimates, particularly for inflows from nearby countries, are sensitive to accounting for 
selective native attrition and within-skill group variation in demand and supply conditions. 
 
 
* We acknowledge funding from the Norwegian Research Council, grant #17352/S20 “The impact of 
immigration on employment and wages of Norwegian workers,” and NORFACE, grant #415 “Migration: 
Integration, Impact and Interaction.”  Data made available by Statistics Norway have been essential for this 
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1. Introduction  
During the past three decades the immigrant share of the Norwegian population increased 
from two to ten percent. And, in line with trends in other high-income countries, the 
composition of immigrant inflows changed radically with regard to country of origin (Bauer 
et al, 2000). Prior to the 1980s, the majority of immigrants came from countries that are 
geographically and culturally close. Today the majority of the immigrant population 
originates in countries much more distant in both respects. An important question is whether 
such demographic changes have implications for the labor market. Both for the evaluation of 
immigration policy and for insight into drivers of economic development more generally, 
solid evidence on how immigration from different origins affects the labor market is needed.  
Our interest is wage effects of immigration. The standard theory of equilibrium wages 
based on a labor demand and supply framework predicts that an inflow of immigrant labor 
into a certain skill group will reduce the relative wage of native workers belonging to that 
group, with the size of the wage reduction determined by the degree of substitution between 
skill groups as well as between immigrant and native workers with similar skills. In this paper, 
we seek to identify this direct partial wage effect of immigration (see the discussion of partial 
and total wage effects in Ottaviano and Peri, 2008). We apply the “national approach” 
introduced by Borjas (2003). That is, we delineate market clusters by education, work 
experience, and year of observation. Immigrant labor supply shocks are captured by changes 
in the share of foreign-born workers within each cluster, and wages of individual native 
workers are modeled as a function of the immigrant share in their skill group.  
The paper contributes to the European national approach literature on the wage effect 
of immigration. In addition, we contribute to the general literature in several ways. First, we 
investigate the wage effects of disaggregated inflows from major regions of origin such as 
developing countries, the neighboring Nordic countries, and other high-income countries 
outside the Nordic region. To our knowledge, no prior study has addressed the composition 
of immigrant supply shocks within skill group.  Immigrants from diverse source countries and 
cultures are likely to differ in their substitutability with native workers. While migrants from 
neighboring countries share language and culture, and bring work experience and educational 
attainment from similar institutions, long-distance immigrants from developing countries 
differ along these dimensions and are therefore less likely to be (perfect) substitutes for native 
workers.    2
Another reason to disaggregate immigrant inflows by origin is that admission 
categories vary dramatically by origin region. Since the 1950s, immigrants from the Nordic 
countries have benefitted from a common labor market with no restrictions on migration. 
Immigrants from other high-income countries often arrive because they are actively recruited 
into particular jobs by domestic employers, while immigrants from developing countries are 
more likely to be admitted on the basis of refugee status or family reunification.  
Second, allocating immigrants to the appropriate education-experience cell is a 
fundamental challenge to this methodology, accentuated by the high rates of non-employment 
among immigrants from developing countries, particularly during the first period after arrival. 
As our data contain earnings records years back we calculate effective experience and 
allocate immigrants from developing countries into experience cells on the basis of years of 
employment rather than years since arrival. 
A third contribution is that, in contrast to past studies, wage effects are estimated 
using a large register-based data set with individual panel information. If immigrant supply 
shocks affect wages and employment opportunities of native workers, a major concern for 
wage impact studies is that native attrition might be non-random. For example, if any native 
displacement is dominated by low-wage workers, the within-skill cell composition of native 
workers will improve following an immigrant labor supply shock, rendering a positive bias in 
estimators that fail to account for compositional change in the data.  An important advantage 
of the panel structure of our data is that it allows us to address any selective native 
employment where unobserved worker characteristics are correlated with the immigrant share 
within skill cells.   
As in Borjas (2003) and following studies, we include fixed effects for education, 
experience, and year of observation, as well as interactions between these variables in order 
to capture any differential trends in wages by education and experience and returns to 
experience that depend on educational attainment. The empirical model also controls for 
within-cell variation in native labor supply. Demographic change caused by variation in birth 
cohort size and expansions of the education system will mechanically affect cell-specific 
measures of the immigrant share. When native supply shocks also affect wages, as in Welch 
(1979), failure to account for demographic change might induce bias in estimates of the 
immigration wage effect. Finally, we allow for within-cell variation in labor demand by 
including skill-group specific indicators for the business cycle based on detailed individual 
unemployment records. If immigrant inflows are responsive to skill-group specific labor 
demand shocks, this is likely to impart positive bias in estimates that ignore the correlation   3
between demand conditions and the immigrant share, leading to understatement of the effect 
of immigration on native wages. 
 
2. Background 
Wage and employment effects of immigration have typically been studied empirically by the 
“spatial approach,” in which labor market clusters are delimited by geographical borders 
within the receiving country. Sometimes combined with a skill dimension (e.g., Card, 2001), 
the spatial approach will generate substantially more cross-sectional variation in immigrant 
labor supply measures than with national labor market clusters. However, as regional 
boundaries are easier to cross than national borders, endogenous location presents a challenge 
to identification in studies of local labor market effects. Immigrants may seek out 
geographical areas with relatively favorable labor demand conditions. Moreover, if native 
workers respond to high immigrant inflows by moving out – or not into – a certain area, the 
wage effect will “leak” from the local to the national labor market.  Both mechanisms predict 
a positive bias in estimates of the wage effect when based on variation in immigrant labor 
across space. To deal with the simultaneity problem researchers have applied instrumental 
variable techniques and explored natural experiment situations (Card, 1990; Hunt, 1992; 
Friedberg, 2001). Reviews of a vast research literature – of which the majority is based on US 
data – conclude that spatial approach studies find small and often insignificant wage effects 
of immigration (some examples of literature reviews are Greenwood and McDowell, 1986; 
Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Longhi et al, 2005; and Okkerse, 2008).         
The national approach was introduced by Borjas (2003) in order to circumvent the 
problem of endogenous mobility between clusters. Individual attachment to a national skill 
group defined by education and experience will largely be determined by educational choice. 
Ignoring endogenous participation, aggregate time series reduce problems related to selective 
location of immigrants and endogenous native mobility. Using data from a single host 
country there is however only one observation of the national labor market cluster at each 
point in time. Thus, one important objection to the approach is that it may confound 
immigration with other skill-group specific labor supply or demand shocks that affect relative 
wages. One candidate is skill-biased technological change that may have improved the labor 
market opportunities of relatively young and highly skilled natives over time. Another 
problem is selective participation within skill cells, causing the within-cell composition of 
individual unobserved characteristics to change over time.    4
Empirical evidence on the relationship between immigration and native outcomes 
remains dominated by studies using the spatial approach. Two recent examples are Dustmann 
et al (2008) and Card (2009). Dustmann et al use the spatial approach to analyze the impact 
of immigration along the wage distribution of native UK workers.  The study concludes that 
immigration depresses wages below the 20
th percentile but generates slight wage increases in 
the upper part of the distribution. The authors conclude that the overall wage effect of 
immigration is slightly positive. Card presents several analyses of the relationship between 
immigration and wage inequality in the United States. Using across city comparisons, he 
reaches three main conclusions: i) workers with below high school education are perfect 
substitutes for those with a high school education, ii) high school equivalent and college 
equivalent workers are imperfect substitutes, and iii) within education groups, immigrants 
and natives are imperfect substitutes. Together, these results imply that the impacts of recent 
immigration on native relative wages are small. 
Compared to the bulk of studies using geographical variation in immigration, the 
numbers based on national variation are fewer, albeit fast growing. Analyzing US data from 
1960 to 2000, Borjas (2003) concludes that an immigrant inflow that leads to a ten percent 
labor supply shock reduces the weekly earnings of native workers by about four percent. 
Aydemir and Borjas (2007) analyze wage effects from changes in labor supply in three 
countries: the United States, Canada, and Mexico. They find numerically comparable and 
statistically significant wage effects of immigration in each of the three countries and in the 
same range as the original Borjas study. The three countries have experienced very different 
patterns of immigration-induced supply shifts over time. The similarity in estimated wage 
effects across countries can therefore hardly be the result of the same underlying process of 
skill-biased technical change, a possible confounding factor in impact studies. Bohn and 
Sanders (2007) study the impact of immigration on wages in the Canadian labor market. In 
contrast to Aydemir and Borjas (2007), Bohn and Sanders find very small wage effects. 
Aydemir and Borjas (2007: 664) argue that the main reason for the discrepancy between the 
two studies is that Bohn and Sanders use a smaller data set with too few immigrants. 
In recent work based on US census data, Ottaviano and Peri (2008) extends the 
structural modeling approach of Borjas (2003) to assess the overall impact of immigration on 
wages while allowing for imperfect substitutability between native and immigrant workers. 
Their empirical estimates point to a negative, but small, direct partial effect: an immigration 
shock that increases the labor force in a particular skill cell by ten percent reduces wages of 
natives of the same group by approximately one percent.    5
Peri and Sparber (2009) focus on comparative advantages and task specialization. If 
less-educated foreign and native-born workers specialize in performing different tasks, their 
model predicts that immigration will cause natives to reallocate their task supply, thereby 
reducing downward wage pressures. Using occupational task-intensity data across US states 
from 1960 to 2000, the study finds that foreign-born workers specialize in occupations that 
require manual and physical labor skills while natives specialize in jobs more intensive in 
communication and language tasks. Peri and Sparber argue that increased specialization 
might explain why many empirical analyses of the impact of immigration on wages and 
employment for less-educated native born find small effects. 
Prior European studies that use the national approach include Bonin (2005), 
Steinhardt (2010), D’Amuri et al (2010), Carrasco et al (2008), and Manacorda et al (2010). 
Using German data for the period 1975-1997, Bonin (2005) concludes that the direct impact 
of immigration on native wages is small as a ten percent increase in labor supply stemming 
from immigration is predicted to reduce wages by less than one percent, with a stronger 
negative impact for low-skilled natives. Steinhardt (2010) replicates the Bonin study and 
argues that the low impact estimate of the prior study is caused by non-applicability of the 
skill-cell approach in German data. When he instead defines labor-market cells by occupation 
and experience, he finds much larger effects of immigration on wages of German natives. 
Examining the effects of immigrant flows to Germany during the 1990s, D’Amuri et al (2010) 
conclude that immigration had limited effect on native wages, but sizable effects on 
employment and small adverse effects on wages of previous immigrants. While previous and 
recent immigrants seem to be perfect substitutes within education-age cells in the German 
data, immigrants and natives are not. Carrasco et al (2008) estimate the partial impact of 
immigration on wages of native workers in Spain with an approach based on gender-
education-experience cells and find no significant effects. Manacorda et al (2010) analyze the 
impact of immigration on the wages of male UK workers using micro data from the mid-
1970s to the mid-2000s. The study fails to uncover discernable effects of increased 
immigration on the wages of native workers, partly because of imperfect substitutability 
within education-age cells. The only sizeable effect of increased immigration is on the wages 
of immigrants who arrived in the UK at an earlier date.  
To our knowledge, no prior study has addressed the origin composition of immigrant 
supply shocks within skill group as we do in this paper. Moreover, prior national approach 
studies rely on repeated cross-sectional data and are unable to address consequences of 
compositional change within skills groups, which we do drawing on our longitudinal data.   6
3. Theoretical background and empirical framework  
According to standard neoclassical theory, an increase in the supply of one type of skill has a 
negative effect on the marginal product, and thus the competitive wage, of workers holding 
skills that are close substitutes (Borjas, 2009). At the same time the supply shift will raise the 
marginal product, and the wage, of workers with skills that are complementary in production 
to the type that becomes more abundant. Accordingly, the skill composition of immigrants 
relative to the native workforce is of vital importance for the total wage effect of immigration. 
It has become common in the empirical literature assessing wage impacts of 
immigration to interpret reduced form regression coefficients within a structural framework 
of one-output, nested, constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production technology. 
Ignoring capital, total product (Qt) depends on labor (Lt) and a technology parameter (Bt),  
(1)  tt t QB L
  . 
Total labor (Lt) is a composite of different skill groups aggregated by a nested CES 
technology with three (or two) levels (Card and Lemieux, 2001; Borjas, 2003, Manacorda et 
al, 2010; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; 2008). At the highest level, labor is the aggregate of E 
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where aet reflects the relative efficiency of education level e in year t. Let is the number of 
workers with education e in year t. The substitution parameter,
1 1 E  
  , where  E   is the 
elasticity of substitution between labor with different levels of education. Labor input in each 













  ,  
where bejt reflects the relative efficiency of different experience groups for each education 
group in year t. Lejt is the number of workers with education e and experience j in year  t, and 
1 1 J  
   where  J   is the elasticity of substitution between experience groups. Finally, each 
education experience group is a CES composite of immigrant (Mejt) and native (Nejt) workers, 
(4) 
1/
ejt ejt ejt ejt LN c M
        7
where cejt reflects the relative efficiency of immigrants within skill group. The parameter 
1
M 1
     , where  M   is the elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants within 
skill group (e,j).  
  In a competitive market the wage of a given type of (here, native) labor equals its 
marginal product, 
(5)   
1 N
ejt t t et et ejt ejt ejt WQ L a L b L N
    
    . 
Our focus is on the effect of an immigrant inflow on the wage paid to the same native skill 
group (Borjas, 2003 Part I). This is the direct partial effect (Ottaviano and Peri, 2008) 
resulting from an immigrant-induced increase in supply, holding native labor supply and 
capital constant (Borjas, 2009). Within the present theoretical framework, the direct partial 
wage effect of immigration may be expressed by the elasticity  









   
     
where  ejt   is the immigrant wage share. In (6) we ignore the shared wage impact of changes 
in total labor supply of group e.  
When 
1 0 M 
   there is perfect substitutability between immigrants and natives within 
skill group and the partial derivative in equation (6) may be interpreted as the slope of the 
demand curve for labor of skill group (e,j). In this case, the change in the immigrant share 
works as an ‘instrument’ for an increase in labor supply within skill cell and any resulting 
wage adjustment will identify the slope of the labor demand curve. 
In the case of imperfect substitution within skill group, i.e., 
1 0 M 
  , the elasticity in 
equation (6) will reflect a combination of a movement down the demand curve for native 
workers of type (e,j) and a positive shift in this curve. We see from equation (6) that a lower 
elasticity of substitution between natives and immigrants will give a smaller (less negative) 
native wage effect. The intuition is that a larger part of the wage structure adjustment will be 
taken by immigrant labor when substitutability with natives is imperfect. Some recent studies 
(Ottaviano and Peri, 2008, using US data, and Manacorda et al, 2010, using UK data) indicate 
imperfect substitutability within skill group, based on the finding that the relative wage of 
(previously arrived) immigrants to natives within skill group drops in response to a positive 
immigrant supply shock.  
To estimate the direct partial wage effect for native workers, we start out with the 
approach of Borjas (2003). Educational attainment and work experience are used to classify   8
individuals into (4 levels of education * 8 experience groups =) 32 skill groups. Immigrant 
supply shocks are measured within skill groups. For workers with educational attainment e, 











 where Mejt and Nejt denote the number of immigrants and natives in cell (e,j,t). While the 
supply shocks are specific to the skill group, we use individual level data and the empirical 
setup is the wage regression model (Borjas, 2003), 
(8)   ln ( ) ( ) ( ) iejt ejt e j t e j e t j t ejt iejt WP s x s x s x Z u          
where Wiejt is the wage of worker i with education e and experience j in year t. The vectors of 
fixed effects are given by se for education, xj for experience, and πt for calendar year. The 
interactions s    and x    control for any education and experience-specific wage trends and 
the sx   interaction allows for different wage-experience profiles across education groups. 
Thus, the (group) fixed effects absorb the influence on wages of changes in total labor supply 
and in the aggregate supply of workers with different levels of educational attainment, as well 
as the change in aggregate supply within experience groups.  










  . 
The regions are the Nordic countries; other European countries plus North America, Australia 
and New Zealand (but excluding former Yugoslavia and Turkey); and the rest of the world. 
This classification can be motivated from differential substitutability (within skill group) 
between natives and immigrants by origin caused by such factors as immigration policy, 
economic development and school quality of the source country, and similarities of language 
and culture. When we estimate immigrant wage effects by origin, we simply replace the term 
θPejt in equation (8) with three separate immigrant shares by origin and free coefficients.   
Note that θ is estimated conditionally on a rich set of time and skill group fixed effects 
that will capture any effects of increases in total and education specific labor supply and 
where interactions with differential time patterns will account for demand shocks that are 
shared within education and experience levels. The coefficient θ will be consistently 
estimated as long as the residual unobserved component of equation (8) is orthogonal to Pejt.   9
Thus, the identifying assumption is the absence of any skill-group specific residual wage 
change that is correlated with the immigrant supply shock. In this, there are two major 
concerns. First, there may be outside factors that influence both native wages and immigrant 
inflows. For example, as business cycle movements and labor demand shocks can be 
expected to affect migration flows of workers with low mobility costs and easy access to the 
Norwegian labor market, one might worry that the immigrant share increases in years with 
favorable employment and wage conditions. In an extended specification, we also include 
wage determinants with time variation within skill group (Zejt) to capture within-group labor 
demand and native supply shocks. We account for differential labor demand shocks within 
skill group over time by means of an indicator measuring the proportion of native workers 
within each cell who were registered unemployed or participated in active labor market 
programs during the year.  
The second concern is that selective attrition, whereby low-productivity native 
workers (within skill group) leave employment as immigrants enter, could also mask any 
negative effect of immigration if the composition effect works in the opposite direction of the 
immigrant wage impact. Unlike most previous studies, we use individual panel data that 
enable us to address the problem of selective native participation. We use two alternative 
approaches to this issue. One, we estimate equation (8) with individual fixed effects; i.e., 
where  iejt i iejt uv   , and two, we exclude from the wage sample marginal workers who 
move in and out employment, i.e., workers with low attachment who will be the source of 
bias from any selective attrition.  
Since our model specification contains a rich set of fixed effects to account for 
permanent and time-varying confounding factors, the remaining variation in Pejt will be quite 
limited and even seemingly unimportant sources of classical measurement error may create 
substantial attenuation bias. Although sampling error, as in Aydemir and Borjas (2005), is not 
directly relevant due to our administrative full coverage register data, there are other potential 
sources of measurement imprecision. First, the allocation of immigrant workers into 
experience groups is imprecise because exact measures of pre-migration work experience, the 
age at which the worker entered the labor market, or temporary withdrawals from the labor 
market are typically not available. Second, generally low returns to experience for 
immigrants from low-income countries suggest that a common allocation rule across groups 
of workers based on potential years of labor market participation might be dubious. Third, 
consistent educational classification across countries is fundamentally difficult due to   10
differences in schooling structure, quality, and curriculum. Allocation of immigrants with 
missing information on educational attainment (see details in the appendix) is also another 
contributor to measurement error in Pejt. While estimation with individual fixed effects will 
account for selective attrition, a drawback of the fixed-effects estimator is that any 
attenuation bias from measurement error in Pejt can be greatly exacerbated. Drawing on the 
approach of Griliches and Hausman (1986), we will examine the importance of attenuation 
by eliminating individual observations close in time and where regression residuals are likely 
to be highly auto-correlated. 
Another measurement issue arises from the fact that many foreign-born employees 
work in Norway without being registered as permanent residents (and are thereby not counted 
in our measure of Pejt).
1  Incomplete  registration  suggests that immigrants may be 
systematically undercounted. Unlike attenuation bias from classical measurement error, 
incomplete registration could lead to inflated estimates of the effect of immigration (“scaling 
bias”). Undercounting is likely to be an issue in data on immigrant presence in other countries 
as well. As illustrations, Warren and Passel (1987) estimate that only one half of the 2-4 
million illegal immigrants living in the United States in 1979 were counted in the 1980 
census, and, according to Hoefer et al (2010), 5.9 percent of the foreign-born population was 
not counted in the 2009 American Community Survey. Below we therefore also report the 
elasticity of native wages with respect to the size of the immigrant labor force, as this metric 
is unaffected by any (proportional) undercounting of immigrants. In the context of the CES 














    
Because of large differences in immigrant shares across origin groups, the elasticity in 
equation (6’) may be a more appealing metric for cross-group comparisons than are direct 
estimates of the parameter θ. For similar reasons, the wage elasticity with respect to the size 
of the immigrant labor force emerges as a more meaningful metric for cross-study 
comparisons of the effect of immigration on wages.
2   
 
                                                 
1 In a study of the Norwegian construction sector, Bratsberg and Raaum (2010) report that about one half of the 
immigrants employed in that sector are not registered permanent residents of Norway.   
2 Note that the alternative metric,  ln ( / ) WM N  , which is commonly used in the literature and forms the basis 
for evaluation of wage effects of a ten percent immigration-induced labor supply shock cited in Section 2, will 
also be sensitive to scaling bias.     11
4. Data  
Our data are extracts of information from several administrative registers that cover all 
residents in Norway during the 14-year period 1993-2006. The core variables are residency, 
labor force participation, educational attainment, work experience, and wage earnings. This 
section provides details.  
 
4.1. The immigrant labor force  
The trends in the resident immigrant labor force over the sample period are shown in Figure 1, 
where immigrants are defined as foreign-born residents with two foreign-born parents. Due to 
high inactivity rates among many groups of immigrants from developing countries (OECD, 
2001), we estimate effects of supply shocks from those actively participating in the labor 
market rather than the stock of foreign-born residents. Counted as labor force participants are 
individuals who are employed, registered unemployed, or labor market program participants. 
The immigrant labor force has increased sharply over time, mainly because of large inflows 
of immigrants from developing countries. While Nordic immigrants remained dominant until 
the late 1970s, individuals born in poorer and culturally more distant countries outside 
Western Europe constitute the vast majority of the immigrant population today.   
Since 1954, the Nordic countries have constituted a common labor region.  As Nordic 
citizens need no permit to take up work or residence elsewhere in the region, their temporary 
cross-border mobility is often not recorded in administrative population registers. Empirical 
studies show that intra-Nordic migration flows have been affected by business cycle 
fluctuations and inter-country wage differences, with pull factors in the receiving country the 
main triggering device (Pedersen and Røed, 2008). The human capital of Nordic residents is 
highly transferable due to very similar languages, school systems, labor markets, as well as 
political institutions, making Nordic immigrants and native workers close substitutes in the 
Norwegian labor market. Empirical studies also show that, while Nordic immigrants in 
Norway earn a little less than natives with comparable human capital characteristics just after 
arrival, they catch up within a few years (Barth et al, 2004).  
In spite of restrictions on immigration from countries outside the Nordic region, most 
workers, independent of country of origin, would receive a work permit if s/he had a job 
contract with a Norwegian employer. In 1975, this changed when Norway introduced a 
temporary moratorium on immigration that was followed by legislation favoring admission 
based on family reunification and protection (political asylum) rather than work. After the    12
Figure 1. Resident immigrant labor force by origin, 1993-2006 
 
Note: Resident immigrant labor force consists of foreign-born residents (with two foreign-born parents) age 18-
70 not enrolled in school and with positive labor earnings, registered employment, registered unemployment, or 
active labor market participation during the year. 
 
 
  “immigration stop,” non-Nordic citizens were granted work permits only if accepted as   
“specialist workers.”
3 In 1994, most West Europeans gained access to the Norwegian labor 
market through the establishment of the common EU labor market, and in 2004 citizens of 
the new EU member countries in Eastern and Central Europe gained access on similar terms 
(with some temporary restrictions). After 2005 the inflow of labor immigrants from this 
region has increased considerably. 
 Between 1990 and 2007, over 50 percent of immigrants from high-income countries 
were admitted as labor immigrants, while nearly 35 percent entered due to family relations 
with these or other people living in Norway (Statistics Norway, 2010). Among immigrants 
from developing countries, only 4 percent arrived as labor immigrants while 57 percent were 
admitted as refugees and about 30 percent on family reunification. Thus, immigrant flows 
                                                 
3 To be admitted under this category the employer had to verify that the skills held by the immigrant were not 
available in Norway. In 2002 this requirement was replaced by a specialist quota of five thousand per year, a 

































Developing countries  13
from outside the Nordic and other high-income countries were less likely directly related to 
business cycle movements compared to other inflows.  
 
4.2. Immigrant supply shocks by skill  
Following Borjas (2003), we compute total labor supply as the sum of labor force participants 
in 32 skill groups defined by educational attainment and potential labor market experience. 
Individuals with one to 40 years of potential experience are allocated into four education 
levels (less than high school, high school, short college/university, long college/university) 
and eight five-year Mincer experience intervals. Our data contain information on educational 
attainment for (practically) all natives and we measure Mincer experience as years since 
leaving school, with school-leaving age computed as six plus statutory years of the individual 
attainment. 
In the baseline case, we compute potential experience for immigrants as for natives, 
implicitly assuming that potential work experience from abroad is comparable to experience 
obtained in Norway. We collect data on attainment from the education register, where 
information typically stems from Norwegian educational institutions, supplemented with 
decennial surveys of the immigrant population. As such, educational attainment is often 
missing for newly arrived immigrants. For immigrants with missing education records, we 
assume that their schooling distribution is similar to that observed among immigrants with 
equal gender, age, and origin. The Appendix offers further details on sources of education 
data and a detailed description of the imputation method for missing observations.  
  Our identification strategy hinges on allocation of immigrants into relevant skill 
groups. For some immigrant groups, experience before arrival as well as years spent in the 
host country are not necessarily comparable to potential experience among natives. Many 
immigrants from distant, developing countries have both limited and a very different labor 
market experience due to conflicts and high rates of unemployment. Immigrant earnings 
profiles suggest that economic returns to potential experience prior to arrival differ 
considerably by region of origin (Barth et al, 2004). While earnings profiles of immigrants 
from the Nordic countries are very similar to those of natives, immigrants from developing 
countries earn substantially less at arrival. The gap is reduced during the first 10-15 years in 
Norway, but there is no convergence (on average) after that. In our register data, we have 
access to complete earnings histories back to 1967 of all residents enabling us to observe 
post-arrival labor force participation among immigrants. Based on these records, for migrants 
from developing countries we replace potential experience with the cumulative years with   14
positive earnings in Norway, ignoring any pre-arrival experience. Constructing this “effective 
experience” measure, we keep the Mincer experience measure for immigrants from high-
income source countries assuming that they have worked and accumulated experiences in 
labor markets very similar to what they enter in Norway. 
  Figure 2 displays how the total male immigrant shares (Pejt) evolve over the sample 
period. The dashed lines show immigrant shares based on potential (Mincer) experience, 
while the solid lines are based on effective experience. As the figure shows, immigrants are 
concentrated in skill groups with short experience and low education. Since the adjusted 
measure reallocates immigrants from developing countries into cells with less experience, the  
labor supply shocks from immigration are even more heavily concentrated in low-experience 
groups according to the adjusted series.   
 
4.3. Native wages   
The wage data are taken from administrative payroll records submitted by employers to tax 
authorities. These records cover all jobs and each record contains a personal identifier for the 
worker. We focus on the pay record for the ‘main’ job of the individual in a given year, 
defined by working hours (full vs. part time), contract period, and total pay. Hours worked 
are reported in three broad brackets only (two part time and a full time bracket).  Even if we 
cannot calculate the hourly wage, we come close by the constructed daily wage computed as 
total pay divided on the number of days of the employment contract. Our primary empirical 
focus is the daily wage for full time workers, but we also report results for all workers 
including those on part time contracts. Finally, we also have annual labor earnings which 
sums wage income across all jobs as well as income from self-employment.   
  Sample means are shown in Table 1. The samples underlying wage regressions are 
based on a ten percent random extract of native workers (i.e., Norwegian born with two 
Norwegian-born parents) who appear in the population register during the sample period, 
1993-2006. (Note however that computations of immigrant shares are based on the complete 
labor force.) Wages are increasing in educational attainment, but differentials are not large by 
international standards reflecting the low returns to schooling in Norway. In our samples, 
workers with low education have longer work experience than other groups because they left 
school early and because they on average represent older birth cohorts. The immigrant share 
is highest among university graduates reflecting high shares of European immigrants in 
particular. Immigrants from developing countries are overrepresented among the least 
educated, although developing country immigrant shares are high even among those with    15
 Figure 2. Male labor force immigrant shares  
by education (1st digit) and experience (2nd digit), 1993-2006 
 
 
(Legend: Effective experience = solid lines; potential experience = dashed lines) 
 
 
tertiary education. For men, the unemployment frequency is sharply and monotonically 
declining in educational attainment. For women, unemployment is more evenly distributed 





















































































































































































Table 1. Sample means 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)









     
Log daily wage  6.71  6.55 6.69 6.87  7.06
Experience  20.6  24.3 18.2 19.7  18.9
Unadj. imm share (male) .066  .072 .051 .077  .085
Adj. imm share (male)  .065  .068 .050 .077  .086
 Nordic  .013  .013 .011 .017  .017
 Other  high-income  .016  .010 .011 .025  .040
 Dev.  Countries  .035  .045 .029 .036  .029
Unemployment frequency  .127  .181 .129 .071  .038
Log native labor force  10.5  10.8 10.7 9.9  9.3
       
Observations  976,479  324,710 374,980 189,171  87,618
       
B. Women       
Log daily wage  6.48  6.32 6.42 6.64  6.88
Experience  20.2  25.9 16.9 17.2  14.4
Unadj. imm share (fem) .065  .054 .062 .069  .135
Adj. imm share (female) .064  .051 .061 .070  .137
 Nordic  .017  .011 .016 .024  .031
 Other  high-income  .016  .007 .013 .020  .065
 Dev.  Countries  .031  .032 .032 .026  .041
Unemployment frequency  .129  .165 .162 .072  .071
Log native labor force  10.4  11.0 10.2 10.2  8.5
       
Observations  599,529  221,702 154,508 188,107  35,212
       




5. Results  
5.1. Baseline results   
We start the empirical analysis with a replication of Borjas (2003), using the same model 
specification and variable definitions as in the original study. Our basic estimates for male 
wage earners are presented in Table 2. In row A, the immigrant share is defined for the male 
labor force. The estimated wage impact (θ) for the daily wage of full-time native workers is -
0.278 with a standard error of 0.073, suggesting that an immigration-induced increase in 
workers within a skill group lowers the wage of native male workers in that group. The 
estimated wage impact becomes even more negative when we include earnings from part-
time work, and is tripled when we estimate the effect on annual labor earnings. The    17
Table 2. Impact of immigrant share on male native log wage 

















B. Include women in 








C. Effective experience 








Observations   976,479 1,031,233 1,152,884
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered within 448 education-experience-year cells. Fixed effects for 
year, education group, experience cell and interactions year*education, year*experience as well as 
education*experience (a total of 174 control variables) are included in the regression model.   
 
 
particularly large effect on annual earnings indicates that hours (i.e., days) worked may be 
even more adversely affected by immigrant supply shocks than the daily wage. When we 
include women in the labor force, the effect estimate is generally smaller as shown in row B. 
One interpretation is that native men and immigrant men are closer substitutes than are native 
men and immigrant women.  
As discussed in section 4, prior evidence both from Europe and North America shows 
that immigrants from developing countries earn low returns to experience from their source 
country. Thus, immigrants from developing countries are likely to be misallocated when 
grouped with natives holding the same potential experience (i.e., years since completed 
schooling). In Table 2, row C, we report the estimated wage impact from immigration when 
immigrants from developing countries are allocated across experience cells using their 
effective work experience in Norway rather than years since leaving school. For all three 
wage measures, the estimated wage effect is somewhat larger in absolute terms than when 
skill group allocation is based on potential experience. For native full-time workers, the effect 
on the daily wage increases in size by ten percent, from -0.278 to -0.312, consistent with the 
adjustment being effective in reallocating immigrants into experience cells where they 
compete with native workers. For this reason, we proceed with the adjusted series. 
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Table 3. Impact estimates with additional controls for demand and supply shocks  








A. With demand control     
















     
B. With supply and demand controls       

























Observations   976,479 1,031,233 1,152,884
Note: Immigrant shares are computed from male labor force using effective experience for immigrants. Standard 
errors (clustered within education-experience-year cells) are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
5.2. Accounting for within-skill cell labor demand and supply shocks   
In spite of the elaborate controls included in the model, there remains a concern that residual 
skill-group specific labor demand shocks may bias the estimate of the immigration wage 
effect in a positive direction if immigrants tend to enter the Norwegian labor market under 
favorable conditions. To control for variation in labor demand within skill group over time, 
we construct a business cycle indicator measuring the proportion of native workers within 
each cell who were registered unemployed or participated in an active labor market program 
during the year. As shown in Table 3, Panel A, estimates become slightly more negative 
when we control for the unemployment frequency. Further, consistent with a broad literature 
studying unemployment and wages (e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994), higher 
unemployment is associated with lower wages and the coefficient estimate indicates that an 
increased unemployment frequency of one percentage point reduces average wages by about 
0.7 percent, which is equivalent to a wage curve elasticity of -0.09 (= -0.7*0.13, where 0.13 
is the mean unemployment frequency in the sample).  
  Our immigrant supply shock measure (Pejt) will be influenced by change in the 
number of native worker in the skill group, as adjustments in the number of native workers 
mechanically will alter the fraction of immigrants in the cell. Due to shifts in educational  
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Table 4. Wage impacts of immigration by origin 




With demand and 
supply controls
Immigrant share by origin     






















log native labor force      -0.042 
(0.010)
     
F-test of H0: Equality of origin-
specific coefficients, p-value  
0.444 0.130 0.102 
Note: Dependent variable is the daily wage of full-time workers. Sample contains 976,479 observations. 
Standard errors (clustered within education-experience-year cells) are reported in parentheses. Immigrant shares 
are computed from male labor force using effective experience for immigrants from developing countries.  
 
 
attainment and fluctuations in birth cohort size, change in the group-specific native workforce 
will be negatively correlated with change in the immigrant share. If a positive native supply 
shock reduces the competitive wage, a concern is that our immigrant impact estimate will be 
biased towards zero. Consistent with this argument, Panel B of Table 3 reveals that the 
estimated wage effect becomes even stronger when we condition on the log size of the native 
labor force in each education-experience-year cell.
4  
The composition of the immigrant labor supply shock may have implications for how 
native wages are affected. From the factor demand theory discussed in section 3, we would 
expect wages of native males to be more strongly affected by immigrants from the 
neighboring Nordic countries because they represent closer substitutes to the native labor 
force than other immigrant groups. At first glance, the empirical evidence does not confirm 
this prediction as the Nordic immigrant share has no effect in the basic specification while 
wages of native men are negatively affected by immigration from developing countries; see 
Table 4, column (1). However, when we add controls for within-skill group variation in 
demand and supply factors over time, as in columns (2) and (3), we find that the estimate of 
                                                 
4 Borjas (2003, p. 1350) fails to uncover a similar bias. The implication is that the Norwegian data contain 
variation in skill cell size (correlated with wages and not captured by the two-way interactions of the model) that 
is not present in the US data.  
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the basic model for Nordic immigration in column (1) is biased towards zero. As the table 
demonstrates, including demand (and supply) controls are particularly important when it 
comes to estimated wage effects of Nordic immigration. Presumably, inflows of workers 
from the neighboring countries, who have free access to the Norwegian labor market and low 
migration costs, are more responsive to changes in labor market conditions than are other 
immigrant flows. Unless we account for fluctuations in labor demand (and supply), the 
negative wage impact of immigration from close countries is likely to be masked. On the 
other hand, inclusion of the labor demand control does not affect the impact estimate of 
immigration from developing countries. These immigrant groups face higher migration costs 
and meet more restrictions on movements across countries. Yet, even though the point 
estimates from the extended specification in column (3) suggest that immigration from the 
Nordic countries limits native wage growth more than immigrant flows from developing 
countries, the hypothesis of equal effects by origin cannot be rejected by a standard Wald test. 
 
5.3. Selective native attrition   
Average wages within skill groups are potentially influenced by any presence of workers 
with low labor market attachment who move in and out of employment (Borjas et al, 2008). 
Unless participation is random (i.e., unrelated to job opportunities), the wage impact estimate 
based on repeated cross-sectional data will be biased if native movements in and out of the 
wage sample are related (in time) to immigrant inflows (Card, 2001). For example, if low-
wage natives are more likely than high-wage natives to leave employment concurrent with a 
positive immigrant supply shock, the average native wage will increase due to change in the 
composition of the employment pool (Bratsberg and Raaum, 2010). In Table 5, we report 
results from alternative strategies to check the implications of selective attrition in our wage 
sample. Rather than specifying an arbitrary selection equation based on questionable 
instruments, we take advantage of the individual panel structure of our data. First, in column 
(2) we exclude individuals with low labor market attachment from the sample by dropping 
those who participated fewer than half of their maximum possible years (i.e., fewer than 7 out 
of 14 years for the majority of the birth cohorts in our data).  With a total impact factor 
including all immigrant groups (row A), the estimated wage effect increases (in absolute 
value) to -0.465, which is consistent with the argument that sample inclusion of marginal 
workers renders a positive bias in impact estimate reported in prior tables.  
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Table 5. Wage impacts accounting for selective sample attrition 









































       
B. Immigrant share by origin        
































       
Observations   976,479  868,876 976,479 319,000  319,000
Individuals      113,220   82,387
F-test of H0: 
Equality of 
coeffs, p-value  
0.102  0.001 0.269 0.001  0.926
Note: Dependent variable is the daily wage of full-time workers. Regressions control for cell unemployment rate 




A closer look at mobility patterns in the data reveals that low-pay employees indeed are more 
likely to move in and out of employment and that their employment correlates with change in 
the immigrant share in their education-experience cell.
5  There are several pull and push 
factors that may explain this association, but we do not make any attempt to disentangle them 
in this paper. From the (limited) perspective of identifying wage effects, sample inclusion of 
the marginal native workforce imparts a positive bias in the coefficient estimate of the 
immigrant share.   
The wage effects of immigration by origin change dramatically when we exclude low-
attachment workers from the wage sample, see Table 5, panel B, column (2).  The negative 
effect of Nordic immigration now becomes substantially larger and statistically significant. 
Even immigrants from other high-income countries seem to contribute to a downward 
pressure on native wages, while the estimated effect of immigration from developing 
countries becomes small and is no longer statistically significant. Importantly, the null 
                                                 
5 Results are available on request.    22
hypothesis that the immigration wage effect is independent of immigrant origin is strongly 
rejected by a Wald test. A persuasive pattern to emerge in Tables 4 and 5 is that the 
coefficient estimate for immigration from nearby countries is highly sensitive to sample 
inclusion of native workers with low attachment and to model inclusion of cell-specific labor 
demand and supply controls. The indication is that Nordic immigration in particular is 
positively correlated with confounding determinants of native wages, and that employment of 
natives with low labor market attachment is affected by immigration from the Nordic 
countries. Once the sample and model specification accounts for such factors, estimates show 
that immigrant inflows from neighboring countries have strong effects on the native wage 
structure and that wage impacts depend on immigrant origin. 
An alternative strategy to account for selective participation (frequently used in 
empirical labor economics) is to estimate the wage equation with individual fixed effects. 
Ignoring origin composition, our individual fixed effects estimate (Table 5, col. 3, row A) is 
close to zero and statistically insignificant. At face value, this result suggests that our baseline 
finding is driven by a negative compositional correlation between unobserved wage 
components and the immigrant share. This conclusion directly contradicts that based on the 
first strategy of excluding native workers with low labor force attachment from the sample. 
We will however argue that little weight should be placed on the full-sample individual fixed 
effects estimates in column (3) because they are severely biased towards zero due to 
measurement error. It is well known that when an explanatory variable is inflicted by 
measurement error the fixed-effects estimator will not necessarily improve identification as 
attenuation bias can be severely amplified. As discussed in section 3, in our application there 
are several reasons why supply shocks from immigrant labor are hard to measure correctly at 
the skill-cell level. Thus, attenuation bias is a concern even with group fixed effects only, 
simply because the remaining variation in the immigrant share controlling for permanent 
factors is very limited and measurement error will represent a non-negligible proportion of 
overall variation.
6 Moreover, since the (true) immigrant share is auto-correlated, the signal-
to-noise ratio in the observed share is reduced even more (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). 
Note that the individual fixed-effects estimator identifies wage impacts via variation in the 
change in the immigrant share within individuals. Becasue the immigrant share is correlated 
across years and shares in neighboring skill cells are highly correlated, the variation in the 
explanatory variable will be reduced substantially when individual fixed effects are included 
                                                 
6 In an auxiliary regression that relates the observed immigrant share to the group fixed effects and interaction 
terms of equation (8), the adjusted R
2 is above 0.9.    23
in the empirical model. As individuals typically alter experience interval two or three times 
during our data window, within-individual variation is substantially lower than total variation 
in the explanatory variable. This will exacerbate any attenuation bias, and might explain why 
the individual fixed effects estimate is close to zero.  
Following Griliches and Hausman (1986), we reduce the attenuation bias from 
measurement error by dropping (auto-correlated) observations that are close in time. In 
column (4) we restrict the sample further and exclude individual observations less than three 
years apart and find that the estimate without individual fixed grows slightly more negative 
than without the restriction (-0.484 vs. -0.465). When we now introduce individual fixed 
effects, the fixed-effects estimate does move somewhat towards zero (from -0.484 to -0.338), 
but remains significantly negative (see col. 5). Compared to the consequence of including 
individual fixed effects in the full sample, the drop in the (absolute value of the) estimate is 
much smaller when we reduce autocorrelation in the explanatory variable. We attribute the 
decline in the coefficient estimate in the reduced sample largely to (remaining) measurement 
error. Thus, it seems highly unlikely that the zero–impact estimate of the fixed-effects 
estimator in the full sample (Table 5, col. 3) is correct, in that the estimator adjusts for an 
underlying negative correlation between within-skill cell wage shocks and the immigrant 
share.  If this were actually true, then the fixed-effects estimate based on the restricted sample 
with observations three years apart should also drop to zero. We conclude from this exercise 
that the concern that individual fixed effects models can make things worse is highly relevant 
in the present context.  
Our main conclusions build on measures of immigrant labor force shares that are 
based on effective experience relevant for the Norwegian labor market. It turns out, however, 
that the main structure of results remains similar if we instead base immigrant shares on 
potential (Mincer) experience; see Table 6. The full sample model with demand and supply 
controls has a common immigrant wage impact coefficient of -0.397 (Table 6, col. 2), 
compared to -0.405 using effective experience.  Again, when we exclude natives with low 
labor force attachment from the sample, the overall estimate is close to -0.5 and the 
coefficient for Nordic immigration is significantly more negative than that for immigration 
from developing countries (col. 4). As in Table 5, the individual fixed effect estimates are 
generally small in absolute value and not statistically significant, indicating severe 
attenuation bias in the individual fixed-effects estimates.  
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Table 6. Wage impacts of immigration, potential experience, native men  























































        
B. Immigrant share by origin         






































        
Observations   976,479  976,479 976,479 868,876 319,000  319,000
Individuals      113,220    82,387
F-test of H0: 
Equality of 
coeffs, p-value 
0.924  0.066 0.316 0.007 0.002  0.601
Note: Dependent variable is the daily wage of full-time workers. Columns (2)-(6) control for cell unemployment 
rate and log native labor force. See also note to Table 5.  
 
 
5.4. Cross-study comparisons  
All in all, compared to the -0.278 estimate from our baseline specification, accounting for 
effective experience, native supply effects, demand shocks, measurement error, and selective 
native attrition, we end up with a preferred estimate (Table 5, column 4) of the direct effect of 
immigration the wage of Norwegian workers that is close to -0.5, which in turn is very 
similar to the preferred U.S. estimate of Borjas (2003). In light of the more compressed wage 
structure and stronger collective labor institutions in Norway compared to the United States, 
this similarity is a bit surprising.  
For cross-country comparisons, however, the direct partial wage elasticity with 
respect to the size of the immigrant labor force may be a more attractive metric because of 
vast differences in immigration levels and because the measure is invariant with respect to 
proportional undercounting of the immigrant labor force. In Table 7 we therefore compare 
our own estimates with a selected number of other studies. For each study, we calculate the  
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Table 7. Cross-study comparisons 
   (1)  (2)    (3) 



















          
Present study, Table 5, col. 4   θ  -0.484 .062  (1 ) p p     -0.028 
By origin:          
Nordic countries  θ  -2.748 .013  (1 ) p p     -0.035 
Other high-income cntrs  θ  -0.568 .016  (1 ) p p     -0.009 
Dev. countries  θ  -0.139 .034  (1 ) p p     -0.005 
          
Borjas (2003), Table 3  θ  -0.572 .1  (1 ) p p     -0.051 
          
Card (2001), Table 7, men, 
row D 
 
1/(ε+σOCC) 0.099 .139  (1 / ) OCC p       -0.014 
Card (2009), IV, Table 5 log 
relative supply of college 















          
Aydemir and Borjas (2007)          
USA  θ  -0.489 0.1  (1 ) p p     -0.044 
Canada  θ  -0.507 0.17  (1 ) p p     -0.072 
          
Borjas et al (2010)   Blacks  θ  -0.346 0.1  (1 ) p p     -0.031 
 Whites  θ  -0.522 0.1  (1 ) p p     -0.047 
          
Manacorda et al (2010), 
Table 7, col. 3 (used by 














          





0.07 to 0.16 
 
0.05 

























          
Bratsberg and Raaum (2010)  θ*
  -0.724 0.085  * p   -0.062 
          
Note: For the Borjas, Aydemir and Borjas, and Borjas et al studies, mean immigrant shares are inferred from US 
Census Bureau (2009) and Statistics Canada (2010). For the Manacorda et al and Ottaviano and Peri studies, we 
use their estimates of the immigrant wage share. In Card (2001), ε denotes the labor supply elasticity wrt the 
wage. In the Bratsberg and Raaum study, the parameter estimate is the coefficient of the term, ln(1+M/N). 
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comparison metric from reported parameter estimates, such as estimates of substitution 
elasticities. The direct partial wage elasticities are evaluated at the relevant sample mean 
immigrant share. As Table 7 shows, our elasticity estimate of -0.028 is close to one half of 
the same metric based on Borjas (2003), -0.051, reflecting that the immigrant labor force is 
substantially smaller in Norway than in the United States. For Canada, Aydemir and Borjas 
(2007) find an even stronger impact on relative wages from immigration. Borjas et al (2010) 
report estimates that imply wage elasticities of -0.031 for black workers and -0.047 for white 
workers in the United States. While Card (2009), based on relative wages of high-school and 
college-equivalent workers across large US cities, reports estimates with an implied direct 
partial wage elasticity in the same range as Borjas (-0.042), the elasticity implied by estimates 
based on occupational groups in Card (2001) is about -0.010 and in line with the national 
time series estimate reported by Ottaviano and Peri (2008). Manacorda et al (2010) report 
negligible effects of immigration on the wages of native workers in the UK and their 
evidence suggests that immigrants who arrived earlier took the hit from new immigration and 
especially those with a university education. According to their reported elasticities of 
substitution, D’Amuri et al (2010) find a direct partial elasticity of -0.029 but conclude 
nonetheless that immigration has limited effects on native wages, partly because labor supply 
effects are mitigated by crowding out of previously arrived immigrants from employment. In 
sum, the recent empirical literature reports a range of coefficients related to effects of 
immigration on native wages. When we convert reported estimates to a common metric, the 
implied impact of a labor supply shift resulting from doubling the immigrant labor force is a 
reduction in native wages between one half and seven percent.  
 
5.5. Female wages  
So far, all results have been for wages and earnings of native men. In Table 8, we report 
estimates of immigration wage impacts for native women, starting with the baseline Borjas 
(2003) specification comparable to Table 2 above (see Table 8, Panel A). 
With the total immigrant share including both women and men in the labor force, we 
find a negative wage effect for native full-time women, -0.386, which is somewhat stronger 
than the equivalent estimate for men (see Table 2). As for men, immigrant inflows seem to 
reduce labor supply of native women and weekly hours in particular; the estimated wage 
effect is nearly tripled when we include part-time daily wages (col. 2). Unlike for men, the 
gender-specific immigrant share has a slightly lower effect indicating that male immigrants 
have a considerable effect on native female wages, see Table 8, Panel A, row 2. Adjusting   27
Table 8. Impact of immigrant share on female native wage 




Daily full-time wage 
Daily wage,
incl part-time work 
 
Annual labor earnings 
A. Potential experience    








      








      
B. Effective experience     








     




















      
Observations   599,529 918,708 1,032,402
Note: Standard errors (clustered within education-experience-year cells) are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
the labor market experience of immigrants from developing countries turns out less important 
than for men, as allocation into groups based on effective experience provides results very 
similar to those based on Mincer experience; see Table 8, Panel B. As for men, the estimated 
wage effect is larger when we control for demands shocks (not reported in the Table 8). But 
since the association between the female labor force and wages is positive (presumably 
reflecting a labor supply effect), the estimated wage impact actually falls when we also 
control for native labor force in addition to the labor demand shocks. 
Excluding low-attachment labor market participants from the wage sample has the 
opposite effect on the impact estimate for women as for men, as the estimate declines in 
absolute value (changes from -0.361 to -0.289; see Table 9, col. 3). While low labor market 
attachment and mobility in and out of employment are associated with low pay for native 
men, many women with high market wages spend periods out of employment (e.g., during 
child-bearing/caring). When we split wage effects of immigration by origin, immigrant 
inflows from the Nordic countries have the strongest effect on native wages, which is in line 
with results for men as well as theoretical predictions. Unlike for men, even immigration  
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Table 9.  Wage impacts of immigration by origin, native women 





















     
B. Immigrant share by origin     


















     
Observations  599,529 599,529 442,571 
Demand and supply controls  No Yes Yes 
F-test of H0: Equality of origin-
specific coefficients, p-value 
0.002 0.000 0.011 
Note: Dependent variable is the daily wage of full-time workers. Cells based on effective experience. Panel A, 
Column (1) and (2) repeated from Table 8. Standard errors (clustered within education-experience-year cells) 
are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
from developing countries seems to have a negative effect on the wages of Norwegian-born 
women. Apparently, immigrants from developing countries who participate in the labor 
market are closer substitutes with Norwegian women than is the case for men. 
 
6. Conclusions  
Norwegian wage data are used to the study native wage effects from immigration, following 
the national approach of Borjas (2003). The estimated wage impact is a direct partial effect 
resulting from an immigrant-induced increase in supply, holding native labor supply and 
capital constant. We find an overall negative wage impact for both men and women. For men, 
the wage impact is partly masked by demand and supply factors that are correlated with 
changes in the immigrant share.  
  To examine whether estimates are also affected by selective attrition of native workers, 
we take advantage of the individual longitudinal structure of the data and exclude workers 
with low attachment to the employment pool. Results show that wage impact estimates are 
easily biased as immigration and participation of low-wage native men are negatively 
correlated. We further provide evidence showing that the individual fixed effects estimator is   29
inadequate in this setting as attenuation bias arising from measurement error in the immigrant 
share is severely exacerbated. Our empirical analysis also points to bias from misallocation of 
immigrant workers from developing countries to labor market skill cells when such allocation 
is based on potential experience. When we account for the various sources of bias—
confounding demand and supply factors; selective attrition; measurement error; and 
misallocation to skill cell—the point estimate of the effect of an increase in the immigrant 
share on the male native log wage increases in magnitude from -0.278 to -0.484. An 
important empirical finding is that each of these factors gives rise to positive bias and 
estimates that understate the immigration wage impact.  
To evaluate the wage impact of immigration, we convert the adjustment coefficient to 
the elasticity of native wages with respect to the size of the immigrant labor force, which 
evaluated at the mean immigrant share in our data is equal to -0.028. A ten percent increase 
in the immigrant labor force is predicted to reduce native wages by slightly less than one third 
of a percent. We argue that this elasticity is an appealing metric for cross-study comparisons 
of wage impacts of immigration.  
Unlike other impact studies, we focus on differential wage effects by immigrant origin.  
We find a substantial negative native wage impact of immigration from the Nordic region, 
while inflows from countries that are geographically, economically, and culturally distant 
seem to have modest effects on native wages, if any at all. This pattern is consistent with 
factor demand theory when immigrant workers from similar and neighboring countries are 
close substitutes to native workers. To reach this conclusion, accounting for demand factors 
and selective attrition turns out to be particularly important because cross-border mobility 
within the Nordic countries is highly sensitive to labor market conditions (Lundborg, 2006; 
Pedersen and Røed, 2008). Indeed, our estimate of the direct partial native wage elasticity 
with respect to immigration from the Nordic countries changes from zero to -0.035 when we 
account for these sources of bias.  
This insight extends beyond the Nordic experience. To avoid the bias towards zero 
that is often present in spatial approaches, even national approach studies need to address 
endogenous immigration and selective native participation when movements between 
neighboring countries are liberalized as in Europe. An important corollary is that common 
labor markets and free labor mobility clearly reduce wage fluctuations, with migrant labor 
flows between close countries operating as automatic stabilizers over the business cycle.   
Compared to previous studies from the United States, our Norwegian estimates of the 
impact of immigration on native wages are more in line with estimates of Borjas (2003) than   30
those of Card (2001) and other studies that find small direct partial wage elasticities. 
However, because the increase in the immigrant population in Norway over the past decades 
has been driven in main by immigration from distant, developing countries with small wage 
effects, as in Card (2009) we conclude that immigration has had a very limited impact on the 
overall native wage structure during the period under study.  
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Appendix: Allocating immigrants with missing education data to skill cells 
 
We use educational attainment collected from the National Education Register. The education 
register is built up from records obtained directly from Norwegian educational institutions; 
the Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund (“lånekassen”); the Norwegian Agency for 
Quality Assurance in Education (“NOKUT,” the agency that certifies education from abroad); 
as well as self-reported attainment taken from census records and two surveys (from 1989 
and 1999) that were administered to all foreign residents with missing educational attainment 
in the register. Despite the many sources of educational information, missing education 
remains a problem in the immigrant labor force data. To illustrate, the fraction of resident 
immigrants in our data with missing education is 0.138 in 1993, 0.121 in 1999, and 0.387 in 
2006.  In order to compute immigrant shares by education and experience levels, it is 
therefore necessary to allocate immigrants with missing data across skill groups.  
Our allocation procedure starts with the assumption that for each observation year, 
birth cohort, gender, and country of origin (broadly defined in four major regions), the 
distribution of attainment is the same for immigrants with missing and non-missing data. To 
illustrate the procedure, consider the 427 resident male immigrants born in 1959 in one of the 
neighboring Nordic countries and counted in the Norwegian labor force in 2006.  Of these 
47-year old men, 129 have missing for educational attainment. Among the 298 men with non-
missing data, the frequency distribution across the four attainment levels used in the analysis 
is 40, 27, 25, and 8 percent. Accordingly, we estimate that, in 2006, the count of Nordic male 
high-school dropouts with 30 (=47-17) years of experience is 52 persons (0.40*129) higher 
than the observed count (120); that of high-school graduates with 28 years of experience is 35 
persons higher; that of men with some college and 24 years of experience 32 persons higher; 
and that of college graduates with 21 years of experience 10 persons higher than the observed 
count. When we follow the same procedure for other birth years, we estimate that the 2006 
count of Nordic male dropouts with 26-30 years of experience is 202 persons higher than the 
observed count of 596 persons.  
Figure A-1 illustrates the observed and estimated counts of Nordic males in the 
Norwegian labor force by skill group and year. We recognize the above example in the panel 
labeled “16” (educational attainment “1” and 5-year experience group “6,” denoting 
attainment less than high-school and 26-30 years of experience). As the figure shows, in 2006 
the observed cell count is almost 600 while the estimated cell count is approximately 800 
(actually, 596 + 202). A pattern to emerge from the figure is that the allocation procedure   34
“blows up” the counts in low education-low experience cells, but does not affect the counts in 
high attainment-high experience cells. The reason for the latter is that, among resident Nordic 
males, no one in the oldest birth cohorts (i.e., born before 1946) has missing education data. 
Conversely, for the majority of, say, 20-year old Nordic males we lack education data, and 
these individuals must by definition belong to a low attainment-low experience cell. 
 
 
Figure A-1: Estimated (solid lines) and observed (dashes) counts of resident Nordic male 
immigrants in the Norwegian labor force 1993-2006, by educational attainment (1
st digit) 
and 5-year experience cell (2
nd digit). 
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